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Abstract— Smartphones and tablets have become prime 
targets for malware, due to the valuable private and corporate 
information they hold. While Anti-Virus (AV) program may 
successfully detect malicious applications (apps), they remain 
ineffective against low-level rootkits that evade detection 
mechanisms by masking their own presence. Furthermore, any 
detection mechanism run on the same physical device as the 
monitored OS can be compromised via application, kernel or 
boot-loader vulnerabilities. Consequentially, trusted detection of 
kernel rootkits in mobile devices is a challenging task in practice. 
In this paper we present ‘JoKER’ - a system which aims at 
detecting rootkits in the Android kernel by utilizing the 
hardware’s Joint Test Action Group (JTAG) interface for 
trusted memory forensics. Our framework consists of 
components that extract areas of a kernel's memory and 
reconstruct it for further analysis.  We present the overall 
architecture along with its implementation, and demonstrate that 
the system can successfully detect the presence of stealthy 
rootkits in the kernel. The results show that although JTAG’s 
main purpose is system testing, it can also be used for malware 
detection where traditional methods fail.  
Keywords— Android; Forensics; JTAG, Rootkits; Security; 
Trusted Detection; 
I. INTRODUCTION  
    Over the last few years, mobile devices have emerged as a 
preferred target for cyber criminals. This trend  is fueled by the 
lucrative private and organizational information stored on those 
devices. Android is by far the most popular mobile Operating 
System (OS); its numerous vulnerabilities, coupled with the 
ease of distributing malicious code through its flexible app 
market, have turned this OS into the attackers' favorite target 
[1]. For example, the Droid Dream attack [2] distributed 
through legitimate applications on the Android market infected 
about 50,000 mobile devices in a course of few days. More 
recently, an Android ‘bootkit’, i.e. a rootkit that modifies the 
device’s boot partition and booting script (codenamed 
‘Oldboot’) has infected more than 500,000 mobile devices in 
China alone, within a period of six months [3] . 
A. Kernel Rootkits  
   Mobile and desktop malware can operate in user space or 
kernel space. The user space malware can modify and inject 
code only into the memory areas allocated to apps and user 
processes. The kernel space malware can manipulate objects 
that reside in the entire memory area of the OS. Although 
sophisticated Mandatory Access Control (MAC) mechanisms 
such as SElinux [4]  are integrated into current versions of 
Android, malware developers still manage to run their code in 
the kernel [5] [6] [3]. Rootkits are kernel space malware that 
use illicitly granted exclusive permissions to hide the 
malware's existence from detection systems, by manipulating 
the kernel's internal data structures [7]. A malicious code that 
has penetrated into the memory of the kernel can neutralize any 
security tool running in the OS. For instance, if an process 
sends a request to the kernel asking for the list of files in a 
specific directory there is no guarantee for the integrity of the 
returned list. Consequently, in order to detect presence rootkits, 
a trusted snapshot of the kernel memory has to be obtained [8].   
 
B. The Proposed System 
    In this paper we present JoKER (JTAG observe Kernel), a 
system that utilizes the JTAG hardware interface of the mobile 
device in order to obtain trusted snapshot of the device 
memory for detection of kernel rootkits. The JTAG standard 
[9] was developed to assist with system testing and debugging 
the circuit board after manufacturing. JTAG’s connectors are 
installed on the Printed Circuit Board (PCB) of modern mobile 
devices such as smartphones and tablets. Our detection system 
uses two important debugging features of JTAG: 
1. The ability to halt the system instantly by sending 
special instruction to the main processor. 
2. The ability to access the content of the device’s 
volatile memory (RAM) while it is being halted. The 
overall system does not run on the mobile device and 
therefore can securely read the kernel’s memory areas 
in a trusted manner.  
    Once the kernel memory is extracted, it is p
array of programmed scripts. Each script reco
data-structures in the kernel and analyzes th
suspicious modifications. We present the sys
and discuss the implementation in details. 
shows that JoKER can successfully det
modified objects at the Android kernel in a tru
C. Method Limitation 
    Using the JTAG interface requires physic
the JTAG port which is placed on the sm
board. Compared to software-based method
may appear rather awkward. However, 
memory acquisition capabilities (from outsid
offers the advantage of trusted mem
Accordingly, our proposed system aims at find
sophisticated rootkits where other detection m
within the device, cannot be trusted. 
D. Our Contribution 
    JTAG, as a general forensic tool for embed
Android systems was mentioned in prior wor
paper introduces several contributions and 
prior related work in the field.  
• First, we are the first to propose an au
focused on detecting kernel rootkits for 
and ARM architecture, by utilizing JTAG
forensics. Our method is trusted since
hardware-based, and transparent to the 
hence cannot be subverted.  We pre
architecture and detailed working implem
detection system, at both hardware and so
• Second, we discuss five rootkit mech
Android kernel and show how they can 
our system.  
• Third, we introduce a new method for 
processes by analyzing the Android
mechanism.  
• Forth, we show how to overcome se
involved with our low-level examination
Those challenges include translating b
and virtual memory addresses, along 
notorious kernel synchronization issues. 
II. RELATED WORK 
   While existing mobile antivirus apps may d
malware, they are in general not effective for
kernel level rootkits [5] [12]. Tools such as th
Extractor (LiME) [13], and DMD [14] 
acquisition and analysis of volatile memo
However, since these tools operate from wit
can be subverted by a rootkit, hence cannot 
be trusted. Android kernel securing and hard
[17] has been also proposed for defending the
space against rootkits.  Hypervisors [18] [5] 
Platforms Module (TPM) [20] [21], had be
provide trusted point of acquisition for kerne
assed through an 
nstructs specific 
em for traces of 
tem architecture 
Our evaluation 
ect maliciously 
sted manner.  
al connection to 
artphone’s main 
s, this approach 
having external 
e of the device) 
ory inspection. 
ing stealthy and 
ethods, running 
ded devices and 
k [10] [11]. This 
advantages over 
tomated system 
the Android OS 
 based memory 
 it is external, 
malicious code, 
sent the overall 
entation of the 
ftware levels.  
anisms for the 
be identified by 
detecting hidden 
 kernel cache 
veral challenges 
 of the system. 
etween physical 
with resolving 
etect user space 
 the detection of 
e Linux Memory 
are helping for 
ry in Android. 
hin the OS they 
be considered to 
ening [15] [16] 
 kernel memory 
[19] and Trusted 
en researched to 
l space memory.     
More recently sun et al presented
assisted system for reliable 
smartphones using ARM Trust
mechanism employed by TrustD
TrustZone’s secure domain ensure
OS and the memory acquisition too
security mechanism runs on the sa
monitored OS, it can be comprom
loader vulnerabilities [22] [6]. JTA
for forensic imaging of embedded 
of Android devices [10] in a gener
the different layers used for malw
acquisition in mobile devices.  
Table 1: Different layers of malwa
memory acquisition mechanisms f
 
Approach Implementation 
Kernel [15] [16] 
Hypervisor [18]   [23] 
TrustZone TrustDump [8] 
 JTAG JoKER 
 
III. SYSTEM DE
   The JoKER system consists of fou
in Figure 1; (A) the mobile device (
a program that extracts the kern
device and manages its analysis, 
analyze and detect rootkits at select
mobile device is an Android devi
presence of rootkits. This device 
with a compatible soldered conn
connected to a JTAG controller. T
hardware component that can comm
the memory controller on the targ
Chip Debug (OCD) connectors. 
program receives the raw content 
communicating with the OCD. F
reconstructs and analyzes the kernel
 
 
Figure 1: Schematic layout of the 
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ised via runtime or boot-
G was discussed as a tool 
system [11] and in context 
al manner. Table 1 shows 
are detection and memory 
re detection and 
or mobile devices 
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device 
Compromise 
Methods 
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SIGN 
r components, as depicted 
B) the JTAG controller (C) 
el raw memory from the 
and (D) set of scripts to 
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ector so that it can be 
he JTAG controller is the 
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et device through the On 
The memory extraction 
of the device’s RAM by 
inally, the set of scripts 
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system’s components 
The detection process consists of three m
halting the processor of the target device
kernel's data structures from the RAM, and
forensic analysis algorithm to find rootkit 
extracted binaries. These steps are described 
subsections. 
 
A. System Halting 
    JTAG can halt the core of the mobile devic
command to the OCD [24]. We use this fu
initial stage to ensure that no code is execute
This fact plays a major role in the detecti
design since the suspicion that the system is 
can prompt a running malware to mask its p
the processor in a single command ensures
cannot prepare its masking before the halt. 
 
B. Extracting Kernel Memory 
   The second phase involves extraction o
memory areas for further analysis in a sep
Modern JTAG interfaces offer rich debuggi
such as direct Read and Write access to the 
memory [24]. We have used JTAG's comman
memory from the RAM of the device while 
decision about the memory regions to extrac
specific analysis techniques. For demonstratio
we used techniques adapted from studies r
based rootkits [25]. Rootkits attack various d
Linux systems, primarily the system call 
vector table and the kernel's processes list. W
on extracting the related memory regions for f
 
C. Reconstruction and Analysis 
    During the third and final phase, the d
applies analysis algorithms to the extracted ra
process involves scanning for suspicious m
memory regions.  The scripts check the integr
call table, the exception vector table, an
interrupt handler. Since these objects shouldn’
a regular Android system, we validate their in
to a clean Android system.  
   Another script detects stealthy processes w
from the kernel's processes list. Unlike the s
the exception vector table, and the software i
the processes list is a dynamic kernel object w
frequently. Detecting hidden rootkit processe
since rootkits typically remove their entry 
order to evade detection. To that end, our sys
kernel's cache which is responsible for main
the OS internal objects. We have app
methodology by comparing the objects 
processes list to a baseline that consists of 
reconstructed from the protected cache poo
between the two views indicates the pres
processes. This method may reveal the prese
ain phases: (1) 
, (2) extracting 
 (3) applying a 
footprints in the 
in the following 
e by sending halt 
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ls. A difference 
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IV. IMPLEMENT
   We have implemented the JoKE
the design outlined in section II. We
controller [26] to communicate with
device. The tests described in this
Samsung Galaxy (S2 & S4) mo
interface. On the software side, the 
B) extracts relevant memory regions
A) via a set of PRACTICE scrip
scripting language which opera
TRACE32 microprocessor develop
product line. Those tools are a
programming access to on-chip d
supports communication with the JT
interfaces. The memory analyzer
receives the raw memory data and 
scripts (Figure 1, D). Each script rec
as an array of bytes, performs its 
returns the results. All logs are save
program and the final results are pre
 
A. System setup 
   Figure 2 presents the system 
installed in our lab. 
Figure 2: The JoKER system, as 
in the lab 
 
The setup follows the outline discu
the RIFF Box JTAG controller (Fi
communication with a variety of mo
on the market. The JTAG controller
port on the target device (Figure 2, A
a connector to the JTAG port on th
other end of the JTAG box is conn
to a computer that hosts the contro
The laptop computer also hosts the 
that the rootkit has tried to 
ATION 
R framework according to 
 used the RIFF Box JTAG 
 a JTAG capable Android 
 paper were conducted on 
bile phones with JTAG 
JTAG controller (Figure 1, 
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own forensic analysis and 
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constructed and installed 
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gure 2, C) which supports 
bile and embedded devices 
 is connected to the JTAG 
), through a flat cable with 
e device (Figure 2, B). The 
ected through a USB cable 
ller program (Figure 2, D).  
PRACTICE scripts that are 
responsible for the memory extraction and th
that are responsible for the memory analysis (F
B. Memory Analysis 
   JoKER is a generic framework which can b
wide range of detection and analysis scripts
testing we implemented five scripts, each targ
type of rootkit technique. The scripts include
table integrity checks, (2) exception vect
integrity checks, (3) two types of software 
(SWI handler) integrity checks and (4) r
process by analyzing the kernel’s cache. To
knowledge, the former method is new and in
first time in this paper. The analyzed kern
presented in Table 2. For clarity, a flow of a s
Android kernel along with the relevant tabl
Appendix A. 
 
Table 2: The list of Android kernel object a
JoKER implementation 
Structure Descript
System Call Table A static s
contains 
level syst
Exception Vector  Table  (EVT) A static 
contains 
exception
handlers 
Software Interrupt Handler 
(SWI) 
A static 
contains 
interrupt 
kmem_cache structure Dynamic
contain 
kernel ca
 
 
    Prior to the system operation, the anal
initialized with the physical address of the o
kernel memory in the specific version of exa
These parameters can be extracted from the
list located at /proc/kallsyms. Note that these
be retrieved from any clean device having the
the kernel. We have developed a Loadable
(LKM) which is executed on a clean (down
official website) Android device with an ide
the Kernel and report the parameters’ valu
system.   
1) Physical to virtual memory translation 
   Since JTAG refers to memory in physical a
to translate between the virtual addresses (O
physical addresses (JTAG view). As the inp
part of the kernel space, they can be calc
virtual address by subtracting a fixed offset.
case is the address of the EVT, since o
architectures the virtual address of the EVT
0x00000000 or 0xffff0000. To calculate the 
of the EVT we used ARM's assembly ins
e Python scripts 
igure 2, E). 
e enriched with 
. For the system 
eting a different 
: (1) system call 
or table (EVT) 
interrupt handler 
evealing hidden 
 the best of our 
troduced for the 
el structures are 
ystem call in the 
es is outlined in 
nalyzed by our 
ion 
tructure which 
pointers to low 
em functions 
structure which 
pointers to 
s and interrupt 
structure which 
pointers to 
 handlers 
 structure which 
information on 
ched objects 
ysis scripts are 
bjects within the 
mined Android.  
 kernel's symbol 
 parameters can 
 same version of 
 Kernel Module 
loaded from the 
ntical version of 
es back to the 
ddresses, we had 
S view) and the 
ut addresses are 
ulated from the 
 An exceptional 
n ARM based 
 must be either 
physical address 
tructions which 
translate virtual to physical addre
tables in our LKMs. Note that on 
disable the LKM mechanism and om
it is still possible to extract the initia
the Runtime Kernel Patch (RKP) 
kernel space memory as has been de
 
C. Detection Scenarios 
   Some detection techniques involv
various structures of the kernel. Thi
performing a ‘before and after’ 
example, when examine an appl
malicious payload into the device. 
analyst will have to examine the sy
installing the application (a ‘cle
installation.  
 
D. Dectection Flow 
   The flow chart in Figure 3 outli
detection from the time that the in
been set, the JTAG controller has b
device, and the communication wit
been initialized. We assume that 
kernel’s memory has been taken 
with a clean kernel version (E.g., 
website).   
 
Figure 3: Outline of the d
implementation of JoKER 
 
The main steps of the detection algo
ss by traversing the page 
Android distributions that 
it the kernel's symbol list, 
lizing parameters by using 
strategy for accessing the 
monstrated in [7]. 
e checking the integrity of 
s scenario is relevant when 
forensic examination, for 
ication that may bring a 
In such cases the forensic 
stem at two points: before 
an’ snapshot) and after 
nes the process of rootkit 
itializing parameters have 
een connected to the target 
h the control software has 
a clean snapshot of the 
previously from a device 
downloaded from official 
 
etection flow in our 
rithm are as follows: 
Steps (1-4): Halting the CPU of target devic
the integrity of the current system call table
version of this table. In cases of inconsistenc
is triggered.  Steps (5-7): Validating the 
current EVT against a clean version of the E
inconsistency, a rootkit alert is triggered
Validating the integrity of the SWI handler
clean version of the SWI handler and validat
of the SWI handler code. In a case of incons
alert is triggered.  Step (11): Extracting the k
list, by parsing each task_struct node in the l
INIT process. Step (12): Reconstructing the l
that appear in the cache mechanism of the ke
comparison between the list of task_str
extracted from the kernel's list, and those ex
cache.  Step (14):  If the kernel's process li
differ by the task_structs, a hidden proces
rootkit alert is triggered. 
 
V.  EVALUATION 
   We evaluate the detection system by testin
types of suspicious kernel modification code
implemented five kernel modules whic
malicious operations. The reason for using 
rootkits rather than original ones is due to 
samples of rootkits for current mobile ph
released to the research community (sou
Interestingly, although kernel rootkits hav
researched in the context of desktop operatin
are no documented samples of rootkits for re
Android. In addition, rootkits which target the
of Linux kernel cannot be installed on the 
This is due to differences in the kernel arch
the OSs, and the modified versions of LIBC
OS. We evaluate the system with Android k
3.4.0 installed on Samsung Galaxy S2 a
respectively. 
A. Kernel Rookits 
   The rootkit mechanisms have been impleme
of LKMs. Each of the five rootkits (Sample
different malicious functionality. Sample 
address of four system calls in the system cal
modifies an indirect pointer of the SWI h
stored in the instruction at offset 0x8 in the 
modifies the address of the SWI handler whic
EVT. Sample 4 modifies the offset of the s
which is stored in the SWI handler routine. S
process by removing it from the kernel's proce
self-implemented rootkits is mainly due to th
few modern samples of mobile rootkits have
Note that self-implemented rootkits as an eval
has been used in previous studies in the field [
e and validating 
 against a clean 
y, a rootkit alert 
integrity of the 
VT. In cases of 
. Steps (8-10):
 pointer against  
ing the integrity 
istency, a rootkit 
ernel's processes 
ist starting at the 
ist of task_struct 
rnel.  Step (13): 
uct which was 
tracted from the 
st and the cache 
s is found, and 
g it against five 
. To that end we 
h perform the 
self-constructed 
the fact that no 
ones have been 
rce or binary). 
e been widely 
g systems, there 
cent versions of 
 desktop version 
Android kernel. 
itecture between 
 in the Android 
ernel 2.6.35 and 
nd Galaxy S4, 
nted in the form 
s 1-5) exposes a 
1 modifies the 
l table. Sample 2 
andler which is 
EVT. Sample 3 
h is stored in the 
ystem call table 
ample 5 hides a 
sses list. We use 
e fact that only a 
 been published. 
uation method is 
18] [12].  
 
B. Syscall Table Hooking 
   The first rootkit was implemen
(syscallTableHook.ko1) which mod
system calls addresses in the system
open(), and close(). We choose fo
that can be used maliciously in ord
sensors and network access operati
by executing a PRACTICE script t
the kernel's system call table before
the rootkit.  
    In Figure 4 we see the two sna
table in a binary form of hex edito
four modified addresses in the tabl
original addresses of the system cal
the modified addresses are marked 
script checks which system calls h
achieved by parsing the header file
tree of the Android kernel. This file
names of system call functions in t
script receives the two snapshots of
the list of functions from the kerne
functions that were modified. The
shown in Figure 5. 
Figure 5: Output of the analy
modified system are detected an
their addresses and names 
                                   
1 Source of the five kernel modules 
Figure 4: System-call table, before
(lower) the rootkit operation 
ted as a kernel module 
ifies the address of four 
-call table; read(), write(), 
ur basic system functions 
er to intercept file system, 
ons. The experiment starts 
o get a binary snapshot of 
 and after the execution of 
pshots of the system call 
r viewer. As can be seen, 
e have been detected. The 
ls are marked in blue while 
in red. In the next step, the 
ave been changed. This is 
 (unistd.h) from the source 
 contains the order and the 
he table. Next, the Python 
 the system-calls table and 
l and returns the names of 
 output of the system is 
 
sis script in which the 
d identified, along with 
                      
will be published online 
 (upper) and after 
C. Exception Vector Table (EVT) hooking 
   In the ARM architecture, each exception
branched to the Exception Vector Table (EVT
central component of the OS and is natur
different hooking techniques.  When a so
happens in the system, the processor loads t
offset 0x8 in the EVT to the instruction regis
(Figure 6).  The instruction that will execute i
pc, [pc, #1040]. This instruction loads the 
with the address of the software interrupt han
resides in the offset 1040 (0x420) relative
program counter 
 
Figure 6: A snapshot of the EVT in the kern
 
    The second rootkit was implemented as 
(HookBranchInstruction.ko) which modifie
vector table. Our implementation technique 
applying two types of modifications to the 
table. First, it copies the address of a new SW
memory at offset 0x424 in the exception vect
the rootkit changes the instruction at offset 
address at offset 0x424 (the new handler) to 
of the original address. This technique allow
hook the SWI handler and intercept interrupt
in the system.  Our system extracts the k
before and after the rootkits installation, by u
script. A Python script reconstructs and co
views. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As can be seen in Figure 7, the instruction at 
exception vector table has been changed from
0xe59ff414. This modification causes the proc
address that resides at offset 0x424 of the tab
address at offset 0x420. The difference betwe
is identified and reported to the system as a ro
 
D. Hooking the Address of SWI Handler Rout
   Another hooking approach is modifying t
routine. Basically a rootkit injects the add
handler function. By intercepting all interrup
calls, the rootkit can perform malicious opera
manner. In our example 
Figure 7: The EVT, before (upper) and afte
rootkit’s modification 
 or interrupt is 
). This table is a 
ally a target of 
ftware interrupt 
he instruction at 
ter for execution 
n this case is ldr 
program counter 
dler address that 
 to the current 
 
el  
a kernel module 
s the exception 
is similar to [7], 
exception vector 
I handler to the 
or table. Second, 
0x8 to load the 
the table instead 
s the attacker to 
s and exceptions 
ernel’s memory 
sing PRACTICE 
mpares the two 
offset 0x8 of the 
 0xe59ff410 to 
essor to load the 
le instead of the 
en the two EVTs 
otkit alert. 
ine 
he SWI handler 
ress of its own 
ts and exception 
tions in a hidden 
the rootkit 
(exvHookSwiHandlerAddress.ko) c
the original SWI handler to anot
space, modifies the binary code of
the address of the new handler at of
vector table. Our system extracts th
and after the rootkits installation
script. Then, a Python script reco
two views. 
 
Figure 8: The address of SWI han
after (lower) the rootkit’s modific
 
As can be seen in Figure 8, the addr
been changed at offset 0x220 in
exception vector table which is off
the table. This difference ind
modification has occurred. The eve
as a rootkit alert. 
 
E. Hooking the Code of SWI Handl
   The last hooking technique inv
code of the software interrupts routi
 
 
Figure 9: Part of the SWI han
kernel memory 
 
Figure 9 shows the part of the SW
address of the system call table wi
current Program Counter. The sy
located after the code of the han
marked instruction, a rootkit can di
to its own system call functions. 
(hookSysCallTableAddressInSwiHa
entries of the instruction which lo
pointer. Next, the instruction i
instruction - ldr r8, [pc, #offset], w
offset of our system-call table. 
   Figure 10 depicts modifications o
identified by our detection syst
(0xe320f000) has been changed
malicious system call table (0xc028
loads the address of the system cal
been changed from add r8, pc, 0x9
PRACTICE script generates snapsh
r (lower) the 
opies the binary content of 
her address in the kernel 
 the handler and then puts 
fset 0x420 of the exception 
e kernel’s memory before 
, by using a PRACTICE 
nstructs and compares the 
 
dler, before (upper) and 
ation 
ess of the SWI handler has 
 the second part of the 
set 0x420 from the base of 
icates that a malicious 
nt is reported to the system 
er Routine 
olves hooking the binary 
ne itself.  
 
der routine code in the 
I handler that locates the 
th an offset relative to the 
stem call table itself is 
dler. By manipulating the 
rect any software interrupt 
Our implemented rootkit 
ndler.ko) iterates over the 
ads the system-call table 
s replaced with a new 
here #offset is the relative 
f the SWI handler routine 
em. A NOP instruction 
 to the address of the 
64c8). The instruction that 
l table into register r8 has 
8 to ldr r8, [pc, 0x80]. The 
ots of the SWI handler, the 
Python script compares them, and a rootkit alert is triggered 
when a relevant modification is detected. 
 
 
Figure 10: SWI code in memory, before (upper) and after 
(lower) the rootkit operation 
 
F. DKOM (Direct Kernel Object Manipulation) 
   Direct Kernel Object Manipulation (KDOM) is a technique 
used by a rootkit in order to hide itself from the OS layer. By 
directly accessing the data structures in the kernel, a rootkit 
can hide resources such as processes and threads descriptors, 
network connections and other objects in the memory. To 
examine the effectiveness of our system against DKOM, we 
implemented a rootkit (dkomRootkit.ko) which manipulates 
the linked list of the kernel's structures representing the list of 
processes and threads (task_structs).  We executed a process 
on the device which simulates the malicious program 
(MalApp) that the rootkit intends to hide. The program itself is 
executed as a user-level process.  Our rootkit scans the linked 
list of the kernel's task_structs, searching for a task with the 
name "MalApp”, and removes it. Note that although the 
process is removed from the link list, it still exists in the 
scheduler’s internal list; hence its execution is not terminated.  
To detect the hidden process, we developed a new cross-view 
strategy which uses the kernel’s cache pool. The kernel cache 
contains the cached version of the task_struct while it is in 
use, or shortly after termination for reuse. Rookits typically do 
not interfere with the cache pool as it is an internally managed 
memory region. We used this fact to make analysis of the 
cache pool and identify traces of hidden processes. Our script 
reconstructs the processes list from the kernel’s processes list 
and from the cache. The results of the comparison (Figure 11) 
show that all the tasks appearing in the linked list also 
appeared in the cache, but there is a task_struct that appears in 
the cache but is not part of the linked list of processes 
descriptors.  
   For the interested reader we point that in most Android 
distributions the cache mechanism does not have pointers to 
all slabs [28] that contain task_structs. Therefore, we obtained 
the slab addresses in the following manner: We traversed each 
Page Frame Number (PFN), translated it into a physical struct 
page address, and then checked whether the struct page 
represent a slab with task_struct objects. From each matching 
slab, we extracted all task_structs.  
 
 
Figure 11: Results of the comparisons (cross-view) between the kernel’s 
processes list and the process list reconstructed from the cache 
 
1) Kernel Consistency 
   When evaluating the cross-view detection approach, we 
noticed that when the list of task_structs is extracted from the 
cache on the clean system, some of the structures might not 
appear in the kernel's process list. Although rare, this behavior 
should be understood and eliminated when dealing with clean 
systems. We found that the reason for this exceptional 
behavior is the way that the JTAG box communicates with the 
device. When our system starts executing any of the 
PRACTICE scripts, the processor of the target device is 
instructed to halt immediately. The problem is that when 
halting occurs, the kernel of the device is, very briefly in an 
unstable state.  The cache mechanism reuses the objects of 
task_struct. Thus when a process ends its execution, the kernel 
should unlink it from its list of processes and only then mark it 
as an unused object in the cache. This process of object reuse 
is not an atomic operation, and the halting of the core of the 
system take place in the middle of the unlinking operation. 
This momentary unstable state causes some active processes 
to appear as if absent from the kernel's processes list. To 
distinguish between malicious processes (intentionally absent 
from the list) and “dummy” processes (absent because of the 
inconsistency), we have analyzed the task_structs of these 
“dummy” processes. In so doing, we have determined that the 
fields of pid, comm, state and flags in the task_structs can 
serve to indicate whether it is being halted.  In some of these 
objects the value of the pid was 0 but the name of the process 
(comm) was not "swapper". Obviously, such an object cannot 
represent a runnable process as the only process in the system 
with pid 0 can be the swapper. Other active objects had a 
negative value in their state field. This field contains 
information about the runnable state of the process, and a 
negative value represents a non-runnable state. The last 
indicator is the flags field which contains information about 
the state of the process. The value of this field is a bitwise-OR 
of all the characteristics that represent the state of the process 
at the moment. If the least significant bits equal 2, then the 
process is in a shutting down mode. Since the kernel's non-
consistent task_structs can be filtered by the indicators listed 
above, we redesigned the detection system to filter these 
objects before comparing task_structs in the cache and in the 
linked list. We executed our redesigned detection mechanism 
on a typical clean system and validate that it does not issue 
false alarms as a side effect of the kernel cache behavior.  
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we present JoKER, a framework which utilizes 
the hardware’s JTAG interface for trusted memory forensics. 
Our system demonstrates how kernel level rootkits in the 
Android OS can be detected in an automated manner by 
employing various memory forensic techniques. Unlike 
conventional methods, our method is trusted since it is 
external, hardware-based, and undetectable by the malicious 
code within the device.  
     JoKER framework extracts areas of the kernel’s memory, 
reconstructs them for further analysis, and raises a rootkit alert 
when positive evidence is encountered. We present the overall 
layout of the framework, along with its detailed 
implementation. Our system is evaluated under several attack 
patterns, demonstrating that it can successfully detect crafty 
kernel mode rootkits, whether persistent or non-persistent. We 
present the implementation of five types of rootkits, used for 
evaluating our system, and show how our system detects 
them. In particular, a new method is introduced for detecting 
hidden processes by analyzing the Android kernel cache data 
structure. We also discuss some technological challenges 
involved with our method, such as translation between 
physical and virtual memory addresses and resolving kernel 
synchronization issues. The detection system demonstrates the 
cross-view paradigm in which the inspected system is 
examined at multiple levels in order to expose contradicting 
traces suggesting the presence of a rootkit, and eliminate false 
alarms. Note that, although the original purpose of JTAG is 
system testing and verification, in this paper we show that it 
can also be used for low level malware detection. We believe 
that our current experimental system can serve as a platform 
or prototype for future research concerning trusted detection 
of mobile devices rootkits and similar kernel-level malware. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Figure 12: The flow of ‘read’ system call in 
from the application level to the kernel leve
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